


Vulnerabilities in web applications

Web = Client + Server



HTTP request contains the URL of the resource and the header
HTTP response contains a status code, the header, data

Client-server interaction

- Web pages (resources) are identified by **URL**

`http://securityfans.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=4841378`

protocol **hostname** **path to a resource** **arguments**

Client request:

GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: satoss.uni.lu

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8,it;q=0.6,ru;q=0.4

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_0) AppleWebKit/537.36
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/38.0.2125.122 Safari/537.36

Client-server interaction

- Web pages (resources) are identified by **URL**

`http://securityfans.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=4841378`

protocol **hostname** **path to a resource** **arguments**

Server response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Connection: keep-alive

Content-Encoding: gzip

Content-Length: 3161

Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8

Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 13:56:31 GMT

Server: ATS/3.2.4

Vary: Accept-Encoding

X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.34-0+deb7u1

Vulnerabilities in web applications

- **Many security holes in corporate IT are due to vulnerabilities in the code of web applications**
 - These are often used as the “weakest link principle” by the attackers
- **Differences between web apps and client-server apps open enterprises to significant risks**
 - JavaScript has diffused boundaries between client and server
 - Web apps are easier to deploy but harder to maintain securely
- **Equifax credit bureau had leaked critical personal data of 143 million customers because of a patchable vulnerability in a third-party component of one of their web app (CVE-2017-5638)**
 - The attack was launched at the **end of July**, but **the patch for CVE-2018-5638 was already available in March!**

Practical approaches in vulnerability discovery

- **Software security is a problem that is very hard to define**
 - Bell-LaPadula model: *“a system is secure iff it starts in a secure state and cannot enter an insecure state”*
 - *“I don’t want my emails to be read by others”* - this is easy to express, but quite difficult to formalize
 - It is nearly impossible to analyze software behavior conclusively
 - Turing’s halting problem, Rice’s theorem
- **The complexity of software systems continue to grow -> more and more vulnerabilities are introduced**
 - Sometimes, we must fall back to a set of empirical recipes

Practical approaches in vulnerability discovery (continued)

- **Plan your actions as if everything is already compromised**
- **Rely on tools that detect SPECIFIC problems, but do not rely on tools completely**
 - Tools can help in finding certain vulnerabilities, but they are nothing without human knowledge (same problem as with signature-based intrusion detection).
- **Learn from (preferably) others' mistakes**
 - There are many vulnerability taxonomies, databases, case studies. Don't forget about Open Source Software

A quick look at vulnerability taxonomies

- **All vulnerabilities are related to flaws in source code**
 - Design and implementation errors
 - Many of them are language/framework independent
- **Categories, classifications, and databases**
 - Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
 - Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
 - The National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
 - ~~Open-sourced Vulnerability Database (OSVDB)~~
 - IARPA Securely Taking On New Executable Software of Uncertain Provenance (STONESOUP)

OWASP Top 10 (2013)

A1: Injection

A4: Insecure
Direct Object
References

A7: Missing
Function Level
Access Control

A2: Broken Auth.
and Session
Management

A5: Security
Misconfiguration

A8: Cross-site
Request Forgery
(CSRF)

A10: Unvalidated
Redirects and
Forwards

A3: Cross-site
Scripting (XSS)

A6: Sensitive
Data Exposure

A9: Using
Component With
Known Vulns.

Injection vulnerabilities

- Assume, an app is written in multiple languages: Java, JavaScript, HTML, SQL, ...
- An app accepts user inputs and does not check them
- Problem: some inputs that look like **String** in Java, might be valid instructions in SQL, JavaScript, ...
- Consequences?
 - From website defacement ...
 - ... to complete control over a vulnerable server

SQL/NoSQL injection

- **Due to insufficient input filtering (or output escaping), attacker-controlled input may be interpreted as code by a database interpreter and executed**
- **Related threats:** Information Disclosure, Data Modification/Deletion, Elevation of Privileges
- **Technical impact:** Moderate/Severe

SQL injection: example

```
UserData data = getDataFromUser();  
String userId = data.getUserId();  
String passwd = data.getPasswd();
```

```
SomeDB.executeQuery("SELECT * FROM users WHERE users.userId =  
'"+ userId + "' AND users.passwd ='" + passwd + "'");
```

```
userid <- "John Doe"  
passwd <- "qweJk@#4kw"  
query <- "SELECT * FROM users WHERE users.userId =  
'John Doe' AND user.passwd = 'qweJk@#4kw'"
```

```
userId <- "Batman' OR '1' == '1'; DROP TABLE users; --"  
passwd <- ""  
  
query <- "SELECT * FROM users WHERE users.userId =  
'Batman' OR '1' == '1'; DROP TABLE users;  
--' AND users.passwd= ''"
```

NoSQL injection: example

```
var login = request.body.userid;
var passwd = request.body.passwd;

var query = eval("({ _id: '" + login + "', pword : '" +
Passwd + "'})");
if (dbprovider.findOne(query)) authenticate(login);
```

```
Login <- "John Doe"
passwd <- "qweJk@#4kw"
query <- ({ _id : 'John doe', pword: 'qweJk@#4kw' })
```

```
login <- "Batman' } ) //"
passwd <- ""

query <- "({ _id : 'Batman' } ) //, pword : ' ' } )"
query <- "({ _id : 'Batman' } )"
```

SQL/NoSQL injection

DEMO

Finding db injection

- **Symptoms:**
 - App gets user input and does not check it
 - App uses user input to construct database queries, uses string concatenation

Language	Keywords
Java (+JDBC)	<code>sql, java.sql</code>
Python	<code>pymssql,</code>
C#	<code>Sql, SqlConnection, OracleClient, SqlDataAdapter</code>
PHP	<code>mysql_connect</code>
Node.js	<code>require("mysql"), require("mssql"), require("mongodb")</code>

Preventing db injection

- **Validate user inputs on server side before processing**
- **In JavaScript, do not use the *eval()* function to parse user inputs, do not use String concatenation**
- **Use special library functions (a.k.a. prepared statements in Java, or *JSON.parse()* in JavaScript) for constructing database queries with user input**

Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

- **Insufficient input validation can allow attackers to plant own HTML or scripts on a vulnerable website.**
- **The reflected variant takes the advantage of the input when it is being incorrectly “echoed” back to a browser**
- **The stored (persistent) variant takes the additional advantage of the lack of sanitization of the data that goes to a DB (and is displayed to users later)**
- **Related threats:** Information Disclosure, Elevation of Privileges
- **Technical impact:** Moderate/Severe

Cookies

- **Cookies are key-value pairs that are set up in a web browser**
- **Cookies are mostly used for site personalization and session management**
- **Cookies can be used by advertisement engines to track users**
- **Stealing valid session cookies allows to impersonate legitimate users**

XSS scenario

- Every JavaScript program can be written as a string that gets evaluated
- Attacker injects a malicious script to yourbank.com
- When a victim access yourbank.com, her browser assumes that the script is being executed under yourbank.com and should be trusted
- The malicious script can access cookies (**unless the “HttpOnly” flag is set**) or any other sensitive information saved by the browser and used for yourbank.com
- The script can also rewrite the contents of a HTML web page to trick users into giving up their personal data

XSS reflected


DEMO

XSS stored

Step 0: developer writes vulnerable pages:

1st one stores invalidated input;

2nd one reads it from a database and with no validation.



Step 2: User browses the site.

Step 3: Web site reads unchecked data and sends it along with attacker's code to the user's browser.

Step 1:
Attacker sends malformed input (code) to a vulnerable web page.

Step 4: User's browser renders the web page and runs the attacker's code (every time the page is requested!)

XSS stored

DEMO

Finding XSS

Language	Keywords
Java (JSP)	<code>addCookie</code> , <code>getRequest</code> , <code>request.getParameter</code> followed by <code><jsp:setProperty</code> or <code><%=</code> or <code>response.sendRedirect</code>
Python	<code>form.getvalue</code> , <code>SimpleCookie</code> when the data is not validated correctly.
C#	<code>Request.*</code> , <code>Response.*</code> , and <code><%=</code> when the data is not validated correctly.
PHP	Accessing <code>\$_REQUEST</code> , <code>\$_GET</code> , <code>\$_POST</code> , or <code>\$_SERVER</code> followed by <code>echo</code> , <code>print</code> , <code>header</code> , or <code>printf</code> .
Node.js	<code>request</code> , <code>response</code> , ...

Preventing XSS

- Validate user input on both client- and server-side
- Set the “HttpOnly” for cookies explicitly
- Use output encoding for correct contexts
- Implement Content Security Policy (CSP)

HTML Attribute Encoding	<code><input type="text" name="fname" value="UNTRUSTED DATA"></code>
URI Encoding	<code>clickme</code>
JavaScript Encoding	<code><script>var currentValue=' UNTRUSTED DATA';</script> <script>someFunction(' UNTRUSTED DATA');</script></code>
CSS Encoding	<code><div style="width: UNTRUSTED DATA;">Selection</div></code>

`Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' *.mydomain.com`

Information disclosure

- **Attacker is able to get unprotected critical data. The data itself can be the goal, or it can be used by the attacker for reaching its goal (exploit other vulnerabilities)**
- **Intentional:** developers have a mismatch with end users on what data should be protected (privacy issues)
- **Accidental:** critical data can be accessed through an error in the code, or a non-obvious channel (e.g., verbose error messages).
- **Technical impact:** could be anything



Information disclosure: intentional

```
1 <?php
2     $UName = "_____";
3     $PWord = "_____";
4     $DB="_____";
5 ?>
```

```
1 def authenticate(uname, pword):
2     if uname == "":
3         return False
4     elif pword != "_____":
5         return False
6     else:
7         return True
```

```
2 def authenticate(uname, pword):
3     if uname=="_____" and pword=="_____":
4         return True
5     else:
6         return False
```

Information disclosure: accidental 1



Information disclosure: accidental 2

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HTTP Status 500 -

type Exception report

message

description The server encountered an internal error () that prevented it from fulfilling this request.

exception

```
java.lang.NullPointerException
    at org.apache.catalina.connector.RequestFacade.(RequestFacade.java:100)
    at org.apache.catalina.connector.RequestFacade.(RequestFacade.java:100)
    at org.apache.catalina.connector.RequestFacade.(RequestFacade.java:100)
    at org.apache.catalina.connector.RequestFacade.(RequestFacade.java:100)
```

note The full stack trace of the root cause is available in the Apache Tomcat/ logs.

word = null;

erence

Finding information disclosure

- App returns the “default” information such as server type, configuration, ip address, hostname, etc.
- There are too many details in error messages (e.g., stack traces), there are unhandled exceptions; non-uniform error messages when handling user logins
- Look for “password”, “credentials”, “login” in the source code - you might find something interesting

Path traversal

- **An application can be tricked into reading/writing files at arbitrary locations (despite app-level restrictions). Unconstrained, such bugs are often used for deploying attacker-controlled scripts**
- **Related threats:** Information Disclosure, Code Injection, Denial of Service
- **Technical Impact:** Moderate/Severe


Path traversal: example

```
String path = getInputPath();  
if (path.startsWith("/safe_dir/")) {  
    File f = new File(path);  
    f.delete();  
}
```

An attacker could provide an input such as :
/safe_dir/../data.db

The code attempts to validate the input by whitelisting.

If the file is within the "/safe_dir/" folder, the file gets deleted.



Path traversal

DEMO

Finding path traversal

- **App gets an input from user that is not being checked**
- **The user input is used to construct a path string to a file/folder (downloading/uploading files, redirects, etc.)**
- **Sanitization functions often contain errors (remember the previous example), so they have to be checked carefully**

Useful links

- *Zalewski, Michal. The tangled Web: A guide to securing modern web applications. No Starch Press, 2012.*
- *Howard, Michael, David LeBlanc, and John Viega. 24 deadly sins of software security: programming flaws and how to fix them. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 2009.*
- *OWASP: the free and open software security community* https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Main_Page
- *Secure Coding Guidelines for Java SE* <http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/seccodeguide-139067.html>