

Model Checking under Refinement-closed Notions of Fairness and Its Application

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Motivation

Any verification using model-based techniques
is only as good as the model of the system.




Motivation

Any verification using model-based techniques
is only as good as the model of the system.



Our verification approach relates properties of the model
to properties of the system along a refinement chain.

Motivation



Model Checking CSP

Refinement Checking

$$\frac{S \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{M}} P \quad P \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{M}} Q}{S \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{M}} Q}$$

Tool Support: FDR or PAT

LTL Model Checking

$$\frac{P \models \phi \quad P \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{M}} Q}{Q \models \phi}$$

Tool Support: ProB or PAT

Model Checking CSP

Refinement Checking

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LTL for CSP

Lowe's Temporal Logic

$\phi, \psi ::= \text{true} \mid \text{false} \mid a \mid \text{available } a \mid \text{deadlocked} \mid$

$\phi \wedge \psi \mid \phi \vee \psi \mid \neg \phi \mid \phi \Rightarrow \psi \mid$

$\bigcirc \phi \mid \diamond \phi \mid \square \phi \mid \psi \mathcal{U} \phi \mid \phi \mathcal{R} \psi$

where $a \in \Sigma$

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$\phi \& \psi \mid \phi \text{ or } \psi \mid \text{not } \phi \mid \phi \Rightarrow \psi \mid$

$X \phi \mid F \phi \mid G \phi \mid \phi \mathcal{U} \psi \mid \psi \mathcal{R} \phi$

where $a \in \Sigma \cup \{\tau\}$

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
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
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
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
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
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
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Lowe's a and *available a*




Lowe's a

The next visible event is guaranteed to be an a

$$a \rightarrow [\tau] \cup [a]$$

Lowe's a and *available a*




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


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


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Lowe's *a* and *available a*




Lowe's *available a*

Whenever the process stabilises before performing its first visible event, an *a* is enabled

$$\text{available } a \rightarrow [\tau] \cup ((e(\tau) \ \& \ \text{not } [\tau]) \ \text{or} \ (e(a) \ \& \ \text{not } e(\tau)))$$

Lowe's *a* and *available a*



Lowe's *available a*

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$a \quad \rightarrow [\text{tau}] \mathcal{U} [a]$

$\text{available } a \quad \rightarrow [\text{tau}] \mathcal{U} ((e(\text{tau}) \& \text{not } [\text{tau}]) \text{ or } (e(a) \& \text{not } e(\text{tau})))$

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
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
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 $\text{deadlocked} \quad \rightarrow [\text{tau}] \mathcal{U} \text{deadlock}$
 $\bigcirc \phi \quad \rightarrow [\text{tau}] \mathcal{U} (\text{deadlock or } (\text{not } [\text{tau}] \& X \phi))$


Finite Traces vs. Stable Failures




$=_{\mathcal{T}}$
 $\neq_{\mathcal{F}}$
 $\sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{F}}$



Finite Traces vs. Stable Failures




$=_{\mathcal{T}}$
 $\neq_{\mathcal{F}}$
 $\sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{F}}$




$\langle \rangle, \langle a \rangle, \langle b \rangle$

Finite Traces vs. Stable Failures





$=_{\mathcal{T}}$
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$\langle \rangle, \langle a \rangle, \langle b \rangle$
 $(\langle a \rangle, \Sigma), (\langle b \rangle, \Sigma)$


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
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 &=_{\mathcal{T}} \\
 &\neq_{\mathcal{F}} \\
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 \end{aligned}$$


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


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


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


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


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


$=_{\mathcal{T}}$
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


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
Stable Failures vs. Refusal Traces



$=_{\mathcal{F}}$
 \neq_{RT}
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


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
$(\langle \rangle, \{c, d, e\})$, $(\langle a \rangle, \Sigma)$, $(\langle b \rangle, \{a, b, c, e\})$, $(\langle b, d \rangle, \Sigma)$

Stable Failures vs. Refusal Traces




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
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
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Stable Failures vs. Refusal Traces




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 $(\langle \rangle, \{a, c, d\})$, $(\langle e \rangle, \Sigma)$, $(\langle b \rangle, \{a, b, d, e\})$, $(\langle b, c \rangle, \Sigma)$

Stable Failures vs. Refusal Traces




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
$(\langle \rangle, \{c, d, e\})$, $(\langle a \rangle, \Sigma)$, $(\langle b \rangle, \{a, b, c, e\})$, $(\langle b, d \rangle, \Sigma)$
 $(\langle \rangle, \{a, c, d\})$, $(\langle e \rangle, \Sigma)$, $(\langle b \rangle, \{a, b, d, e\})$, $(\langle b, c \rangle, \Sigma)$

Stable Failures vs. Refusal Traces




$(\langle \rangle, \{c, d, e\})$, $(\langle a \rangle, \Sigma)$, $(\langle b \rangle, \{a, b, c, e\})$, $(\langle b, d \rangle, \Sigma)$
 $(\langle \rangle, \{a, c, d\})$, $(\langle e \rangle, \Sigma)$, $(\langle b \rangle, \{a, b, d, e\})$, $(\langle b, c \rangle, \Sigma)$

Stable Failures vs. Refusal Traces




$\langle \{c, d, e\}, b, \{a, b, c, e\}, d, \Sigma \rangle, \langle \{a, c, d\}, b, \{a, b, d, e\}, c, \Sigma \rangle$

Stable Failures vs. Refusal Traces




$\langle \{c, d, e\}, b, \{a, b, c, e\}, d, \Sigma \rangle, \langle \{a, c, d\}, b, \{a, b, d, e\}, c, \Sigma \rangle$

Stable Failures vs. Refusal Traces



$\langle \{c, d, e\}, b, \{a, b, c, e\}, d, \Sigma \rangle, \langle \{a, c, d\}, b, \{a, b, d, e\}, c, \Sigma \rangle$
 $\langle \{c, d, e\}, b, \{a, b, d, e\}, c, \Sigma \rangle, \langle \{a, c, d\}, b, \{a, b, c, e\}, d, \Sigma \rangle$

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$\langle \{c, d, e\}, b, \{a, b, c, e\}, d, \Sigma \rangle, \langle \{a, c, d\}, b, \{a, b, d, e\}, c, \Sigma \rangle$
 $\langle \{c, d, e\}, b, \{a, b, d, e\}, c, \Sigma \rangle, \langle \{a, c, d\}, b, \{a, b, c, e\}, d, \Sigma \rangle$

Model Checking CSP

Refinement Checking

$$\frac{S \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{M}} P \quad P \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{M}} Q}{S \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{M}} Q}$$

Tool Support: FDR or PAT

LTL Model Checking

$$\frac{P \models \phi \quad P \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{RT}} Q}{Q \models \phi}$$

Tool Support: ProB and FDR

Fairness

Weak Event Fairness

$$WEF = \bigwedge_{x \in \Sigma} (\diamond \square \text{enabled } x \Rightarrow \square \diamond x)$$

A constantly often enabled event shall occur infinitely often

Strong Event Fairness

$$SEF = \bigwedge_{x \in \Sigma} (\square \diamond \text{enabled } x \Rightarrow \square \diamond x)$$

An infinitely often enabled event shall occur infinitely often

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
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
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
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
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Model Checking CSP

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$$\frac{S \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{M}} P \quad P \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{M}} Q}{S \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{M}} Q}$$

Tool Support: FDR or PAT

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$$\frac{P \models \phi \quad P \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{RT}} Q}{Q \models \phi}$$

Tool Support: ProB and FDR


Application to Fair Exchange Protocols

$$SND_2 = snd.A.B.Na \rightarrow SND_2$$

$$RCV_2 = rcv.A.B.Na \rightarrow flag \rightarrow Stop$$

$$SYS_2 = (SND_2 ||| RCV_2) || \text{Spy}^{L\dagger}$$

{|snd,rcv|}




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Conclusion

Refinement Checking

$$\frac{S \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{M}} P \quad P \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{M}} Q}{S \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{M}} Q}$$

Tool Support: FDR or PAT

LTL Model Checking

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Tool Support: ProB and FDR

Future Work - Scaling the Approach

Strong Event Fairness

$$SEF = \bigwedge_{x \in \Sigma} (\Box \Diamond \text{available } x \Rightarrow \Box \Diamond x)$$

An infinitely often enabled event shall occur infinitely often

$$\begin{aligned} & ((\Box \Diamond \text{available } \text{snd}.A.B.Na \Rightarrow \Box \Diamond \text{snd}.A.B.Na) \\ & \wedge (\Box \Diamond \text{available } \text{rcv}.A.B.Na \Rightarrow \Box \Diamond \text{rcv}.A.B.Na)) \\ & \Rightarrow \Box \Diamond \text{flag} \end{aligned}$$

Future Work - Scaling the Approach


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Applications



Conclusion

Any verification using model-based techniques
is only as good as the model of the system.



Our verification approach relates properties of the model
to properties of the system along a refinement chain.